The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2015

The Subject Was Standards: The Federal
Government and Safety in the 1940's - And 1970's
Judy Jackson

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Jackson, Judy (1977) "The Subject Was Standards: The Federal Government and Safety in the 1940's - And 1970's,"
Akron Law Review: Vol. 10 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Jackson: The Federal Government and Safety

THE SUBJECT WAS STANDARDS:
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SAFETY IN THE
1940's-AND 1970's
JUDY JACKSON*

INTRODUCTION

Standardsas the "Law" of the HazardousProductsJungle-1976

T

1976 issue of Trial magazine has emblazoned across its cover
"The Hazardous Products Jungle". The cover shows a bicycle, chain
saw, stove, vacuum cleaner, TV set, football helmet and other consumer
products engulfed in Henri Rousseau-like jungle foliage.
HE MAY,

Such a cover, with its implication that many consumer products presenting unreasonable risks remain on the market over three years after
passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (CPSA), epitomizes
the general disappointment with the performance of the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the independent regulatory agency
created by the 1972 Act to protect the public against "unreasonable risks
associated with consumer products." 2
In the articles inside the May Trial, the five authors evaluating the
Commission's performance, though representing differing viewpoints, 8 all
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law; Consumer Member, Product
Safety Advisory Council, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n; B.A., University of Iowa;

LL.B., University of Illinois.
1 15 U.S.C. §§2051-81 (Supp. IV, 1974).

2 The CPSA sets forth its purposes as follows:

(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer
products;
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products;
(3)

to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to minimize con-

flicting State and local regulations; and
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of productrelated deaths, illnesses, and injuries. 15 U.S.C. §2051(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
3 The

five authors were Edward M. Swartz, a Boston trial lawyer; the author, presenting a
consumer advocacy viewpoint; John W. Locke, former acting Executive Director of the CPSC
and now Director of Technical Services for Can Manufacturers Institute; CPSC Commissioner R. David Pittle, and John Hayward, a Cambridge, Massachusetts trial lawyer and former
Director of ATLA's Products Liability Exchange.
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generally focus their criticism on the safety standards process,' and in particular on a January 30, 1976 statement made by then CPSC Chairman Richard
Simpson 5 before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Chairman Simpson's
statement set forth a plan to establish 100mandatory safety standards6 in the
next six years which he claimed would eliminate "approximately 75% of
the correctible risk attributable to unsafe consumer products." 7 Upon completion of such a goal, Simpson stated, the Commission could either be
restructured into a maintenance and enforcement function, be given a new

mission, or be abolished.
In the same January 30, 1976 statement, Mr. Simpson, almost in passing,
revealed another- implication of the "100 mandatory standards" plan. In the
middle of his description of the Commission's compliance program, he stated:
On the more positive side, I believe it would add another dimension
to our compliance effort if affected companies, who are complying
with existing standards, were not foreclosed from citing that demon-

strated compliance in the course of product liability actions. At present

.this is specifically foreclosed by the language of Section 25 (a) of the
Consumer Product Safety Act. I recommend that this language be
repealed.'
4 The CPSA provides:
A consumer product safety standard shall consist of one or more of any of the following
types of requirements:
(1) Requirements as to performance, composition, contents, design construction,
finish, or packaging of a consumer product.
(2) Requirements that a consumer product be marked with or accompanied by
clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or requirements respecting the
form of warnings or instructions.
Any requirement of such a standard shall be reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce
an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product. The requirements of such
a standard (other than requirements relating to labeling, warnings, or instructions) shall,
whenever feasible,- be expressed in terms of performance requirements. 15 U.S.C.
§2056(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
5 Chairman Simpson submitted his resignation on December 3, 1975, but served until his
successor was confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 1976.
6 Mandatory standards. are standards required by federal law,. such as the standards promulgated 'under the CPSA. Voluntary standards are standards developed by private industrial
entities. While a voluntary standard could be proclaimed by a single manufacturer, generally
voluntary standards are proclaimed by a voluntary standards organization, such as the American National Standards Institute or the American Society for Testing and Materials. Voluntary standards are essentially a means of so-called industry self-regulation. For further explanation, see NCPS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY,
ch.4 (June 1970) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
7 Statement of Richard 0. Simpson, former Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n, in Hearings on Regulatory Reform Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30.
(1976). Chairman Simpson's reference to the "correctable risk attributable to unsafe consum-;
er products" refers to the commonly accepted assumption among safety experts that the "products-caused" or "standards-preventable" portion of product associated injuries is 15-25%. Id.
8 Id. at 29.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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Section 25(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act provides that
"Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other rules or orders
under this act shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or
under State statutory law to any other person."' The legislative history of
this provision, while sparse, suggests that Section 25 (a) would be interpreted
by the courts not to make evidence of compliance inadmissible, but simply
not conclusive, so as not to "relieve any person from liability. ' 10 If the import of Mr. Simpson's statement is that Congress should change "what is
specifically foreclosed" by Section 25 (a), what is apparently being suggested
is that a manufacturer's compliance with Commission consumer product
safety rules should "relieve him of liability" in private litigation.
The author has described elsewhere1" a possible 1982 scenario implicit
in the 100 standards by 1982-repeal Section 25(a) plan. In brief, that
scenario would find the 100 standards written by industry under Section 7
offeror process,'" with little upgrading by the Commission through the informal rulemaking process. The standards would do little more than ratify
existing manufacturer safety practices, and industry would have little problem complying with the standards. Products in compliance would continue
to injure users, but the manufacturer would have a statutory defense in a
products liability action.
The juxtaposition of these two ideas-a standards approach to product
safety regulation and the use of such safety standards as conclusory in private
litigation-is neither new nor accidental. It is an industry dream begun as
long. ago as 1947 which began to become reality in the summer of 1976,
when, in the wake of over 20 thus far unexplained deaths in Philadelphia of
"Legionnaire's disease", Congress enacted the "National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976" Act"3 (Swine Flu Act). This Act protects vaccine
manufacturers, physicians and other health personnel "against liability for
other than their own negligence"'" in administration of the swine flu vaccination program, and therefore provides an exclusive remedy against the United
States to persons alleging injury from vaccine inoculation "because of the

9 15 U.S.C. §2074(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
10 Jackson, The Relaxed Regulator, TRIAL, May, 1976, at 13.
11 Id. at 13, 16.
12 Sections 7 &

9 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. §§2056 and 2058, the so-called "offeror"

provision, allows a private group to develop a recommended safety standard and submit it

to the Commission for evaluation, revision, and promulgation as a federal safety standard
through the informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§553 (1970).
"3 Pub. L. No. 94-380 (Aug. 12, 1976).

24 Id.by§2.IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
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unique role of the United States in the initiation, planning, and administration of the program.""
While the rapid passage" of the Swine Flu Act can be considered as a
unique governmental response to a perceived public health crisis, the original
precipitating factor-the vaccine manufacturers' alleged inability to obtain
private liability insurance-reflects a more general emerging problem: the
reports of manufacturers in a number of industries that they are experiencing
difficulty in obtaining products liability insurance."
Such manufacturers can be expected to argue in the future that their
products are also so comprehensively regulated by such governmental ageneieg
as the Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Department of Transportation and other federal agencies that they too should
be protected by the federal government against liability except for negligence.
Drug industry spokesmen made this argument as long ago as 1968 in the
wake of the 1962 Kefauver amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938,11 and, as several Senators noted19 in the floor debate on the
15 ld.
16 Both the Senate and House considered and passed the National Swine Flu Immunization

Program of 1976 Act on August 10, 1976. 122 CONG. REc. S14107-22 H8642-55 (daily ed.
Aug. 10, 1976). The only Senate committee to file a report on the bill was the Appropriations Committee, to which the bill was referred on August 10. The Appropriations Committee held no hearings, and reported the bill without recommendation. S. REP. No. 1147,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Senate voted on August 6, 1976 to discharge the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, which had held hearings on August 6, from further consideration of the bill. 122 CoNO. REc. S13871 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976). Neither the Senate Judiciary Committee nor the Budget Committee considered the bill, although it involved amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (1976), and, as noted in a
Budget Committee staff memorandum, was subject to a technical point of order under the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §1351 (The staff memorandum appears at 122 CONG. REc. S14118-119 [daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976]). The only House
Committee to file a report on the bill was the House Rules Committee, which reported a
privileged resolution, H.Res. 1473, H.R. REP. No. 94-1421 on August 10, whose adoption
by the House on August 10 allowed the bill to be taken from the Speaker's desk for immediate consideration by the House. The only House Committee other than Rules to consider the bill was the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which held hearings on June 28 and July 20, 1976, and
on August 3, 1976 reported a bill described by Subcommittee Chairman Paul Rogers
(D-Fla.) as "very similar to the one before the House at this time." 122 CoNG. REc. H8648
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976). The House Judiciary Committee never considered the bill, although
its Staff did review it, and Committee Chairman Peter Rodino (D-N.J.) did send a letter
to House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee Chairman Harley Staggers (D-W.Va.)
stating that "the bill makes no changes in the Tort Claims Act, and has no impact on it,
except that in the narrow circumstances of suits under the bill, the Government would waive
the discretionary act exemption of the Tort Claims Act and would open itself to liability in
the absence of negligence." Id. at H8650. The House Budget Committee did not consider
the bill.
17 Compare U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF DoiEsTIc COMMERCE STAFF STUDY
ON
PRODUCT LIABILrrY INsURANCE (1976), with Massery, The Regulated Cry Wolf About Insurance Rates, TUAL, May, 1976, at 3 1.
Is Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §101 et seq., 76 Stat. 781 amending 21 U.S.C.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
§321 et seq. (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §321 et seq. [1970]).
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Swine Flu Act, have already argued for similar protection in all public
inoculation programs such as polio, measles, and mumps.
Industry attempts to use federal regulation and particularly federal
safety standards to insulate themselves from private liability long precede
1976 and 1968, however. Indeed, the juxtaposition of a standards approach
to product safety regulation and the use of such standards as conclusory in
private litigation appears in the first Congressional hearings on product
safety regulation, the 1947 Hearings on Inflammable Fabrics before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Before considering,
however, the 1947 Hearings for what they reveal about the limitations and
implications of the standards approach to product safety regulation, the
operation of the "standards consenus" in the 1960's must be reviewed.
I. THE STANDARDS CONSENSUS 1966-1970
Chairman Simpson's assumption in his Congressional testimony that
the primary function of the CPSC is to issue safety standards reflects an
approach to product safety regulation which has a long history. To cite
one relatively recent statement of this approach, Mrs. Virginia Knauer, two
weeks after her appointment by President Richard M. Nixon as Special
Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, testified before the National
Commission on Product Safety on May 1, 1969, that she believed that "the
development of comprehensive safety standards is the key to this problem
of product safety."2 Her statement was widely quoted in both the industry
and the public press.2 Indeed, perhaps the most widely shared assumption
by government, 2 industry, 2 and consumer advocates" in the middle 1960's
10 122 CONG. REC. S14111, S14119 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976).
20

HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, vol. 4, at 373 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as NCPS HEARINGS]. The creation of the National Commission on
Product Safety (NCPS) was mandated by Congress to "conduct a comprehensive study
and investigation of the scope and adequacy of measures now employed to protect consumers
against unreasonable risks of injuries which may be caused by hazardous household products." Act of Nov. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-146, §2(a), 81 Stat. 467. The NCPS issued
its final report on June 30, 1970, which recommended "that the federal government both
to protect consumers and to strengthen manufacturers' efforts, should enact comprehensive
legal measures to reduce hazards" and that "Broad responsibility for the safety of consumer
products should be vested in a conspicuously independent federal regulatory agency, a Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 4, 5. The Final Report also contained a draft
of a "proposed Consumer Product Safety Act" which, together with certain proposals for
alternative legislation introduced by the Nixon Administration, became the basis for Pub. L.
No. 92-573, the Consumer Product Saftey Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§2051-81 (Supp. IV,
1974).
21 See, e.g., Report in Washington Post, May 2, 1969.
22 E.g., S. REP. No. 1301 to accompany S. 3005, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 ("The promotion of motor vehicle safety
though voluntary standards has largely failed. The unconditional imposition of mandatory
the earliest practicable
standardsby at
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977 date is the only course commensurate with the highway
death and injury toll"); Testimony of Gordon A. Christenson, Former Assistant General
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was that "standards" were the sine qua non for federal consumer legislation

in general. This "standardsitis" is vividly reflected by A. Q. Mowbray, when
he wrote:
What the consumer needs in order to make rational choices among
competing products is standards for these products-standards of performance, standards of durability, and standards of safety."
Mowbray stated that "the paucity of standards for consumer protection is
at the heart of most of the consumer questions that have found their way
to Washington during the past several years." He cited federal auto standards
Counsel for Science and Technology, Department of Commerce, NCPS HEARINGS, supra note
20, vol. 3A, at 361 ("So let me propose what I think are essential requirements for a national
product safety policy . . . it is nonsense to . . . call it to the public's attention every time
there is an incident and have hearings such as this . . . before the Commerce Committees
of both houses on particular things. It is time that we should set a national policy for
standards-making, and a process by which it can be pulled out of the voluntary mechanism
and abuses corrected by the public."). Arnold Elkind, Chairman, National Commission on
Product Safety, presents a contrasting viewpoint, which, while recognizing the importance of
standards, sees a more modest federal role.
Underlying the entire problem is the voluntary standards system of setting safety standards for products . . .. I personally don't think it is possible or practicable for the
government to set safety standards for all products, but there must be some kind of
federal presence-a body similar to the Commission should remain in existence to
conduct investigations, hold hearings and make public statements about specific products.
Quoted in NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 1969.
23
E.g., Testimony of Aaron Locker on behalf of Toy Manufacturers of America, NCPS
HEARINGS, supra note 20, vol. 2, at 265-66:
In recent years, however, the industry has been aware of the fact that something more
than an after-the-fact approach was necessary. So, in 1950 we began . . . to develop
the first of what we hope will be a very broad scale program of safety standards with
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Standards Association, as it
was then known .... We are now in the process of breaking down the ... several
hundreds of categories [for toys] with a view towards developing safety standards for
each of these categories...
See also testimony of Baron Whitaker, Underwriters Laboratory, NCPS HEARINGS, supra
note 20, vol. 3B, at 489:
An important aspect of product safety is the ability to determine when the design and
use concepts of a new product have stabilized to the point that standardization in the
area of safety requirements is practicable . . . . If standardization occurs too quickly
in a new product area, there is a restrictive effect which tends to limit the ingenuity
of the designer and the potential benefits to the user. If standardization is delayed too
long, on the other hand, there will be tremendous problems in achieving a product
standard because of the economic sacrifices which must be made in unifying the safety
aspects of products which have been developed to appeal to somewhat differently
weighted desires of the user.
24 E.g., Testimony of Margaret Dana, NCPS HEARINGS, supra note 20, vol. 3A, at 324 ("I say
a standard is needed, for even so simple a thing as a wooden match, when its lack of standard creates a hazard"); testimony of Ralph Nader, Id., vol. 3B, at 531, 532 ("However they
are written, safety codes place a certain general value on human life and limb by making a
judgment on the level and coverage of the technology or technique to be employed. It is
indisputably clear that these standards affect the most vital interest of the society-its health
and safety-and that such an interest is probably the most primordial function of government
to pursue.")
25

Mowbray, What Consumers Need: Show Biz or Hard Facts, Tum NATION, Sept. 15, 1969,

at 245.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,6 truth
in packaging standards under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966," '
truth in lending legislation 28 as requiring "standard methods of stating the
cost of borrowing", and federal meat inspection standards under the Federal
Meat Inspection Act." Mowbray contrasted the consumer marketplace, where
the seller and the consumer do not have equal bargaining power or technical
expertise, with the commercial market, where buyers and sellers deal with
each other in terms of specifications, and agreed-on standards specifications
and standard testing methods. He stated that "[T]he plea now from consumer
advocates is for a nation-wide systematic program to develop standards for
consumer products .... the key question is, will such a program be organized
by industry, by government, or by a cooperative effort of the two.""0
Given this widespread equation of "standards" with consumer protection, it is not surprising that the debate in product safety in the late 1960's
centered primarily around the question of who would develop and write the
necessary standards rather than on the question of whether standards setting
should be the primary approach to products safety regulation. Consumer
advocates such as Ralph Nader argued that safety standards should be written by the government. 1 Industry groups generally described their participation in voluntary standards organizations such as the American National
Standards Institute, and argued that such voluntary self regulation should
be supplemented by government financing and other support." The Final
Report of the National Commission on Product Safety, issued in June, 1970,
reflected both these views in its recommendation that the proposed Consumer Product Safety Commission "be invested with authority to develop
and set mandatory consumer product safety standards where industry's own
26 15 U.S.C. §§1381-1431 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
27
28

15 U.S.C. §§1451-61 (1970).
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601-81 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).

29 21 U.S.C. §§601-95 (1970).
30 Mowbray, supra note 25, at 246. Mowbray was not alone in the middle 1960's in looking
at standards as a communications device between the mass seller and the consumer. For example, Margaret Dana, a self-styled consumer advocate, testified before the National Commission on Product Safety as follows:
But what I think this Commission is beginning to see . . . is that standards today are
the mutually understood language, the same words to describe the same things from
producer, distributor to consumer and, of course, through Government. We desperately
need this kind of standard to use as measuring sticks to replace the old traditional
know-how which we lost in our product explosion.
NCPS HEARINGS, supra note 20, vol. 3A, at 313.
31 NCPS Hearings, supra note 20, vol. 3B, at 531. (Testimony of Ralph Nader).
32

Statement of M. N. Zeolla, P.P.G. Industries, NCPS HEARINGS, supra note 20, vol. 3A, at

176; statement of George Stoltz, American Aluminum Mfrs. Ass'n, Id., at 91-94; statement of
Ass'n, Id., at 117-19.
C. Nitschke, Glass Tempering
Norman
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977
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efforts are not sufficient to protect consumers from unreasonable risks of
death or injury.""
In retrospect, it is perhaps surprising that no one seriously questioned
the assumption that product safety standards were the answer to product
safety. At the time of the National Commission on Product Safety Final
Report in June 1970, probably the most comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of federal consumer product safety legislation was a study' directed
by Howard Heffron commissioned by the NCPS itself.
Heffron's study was concerned with how three major consumer safety
programs-auto safety, 5 flammable fabrics," and hazardous substances'had worked in practice. Heffron devoted a significant part of his report to a
detailed analysis of what he described as "constraints on standard setting."
He described the auto safety regulation program as "a disappointment to
many" and noted that "[Tlhere is no radical new 'safety' car even close to
production, the traffic toll has not declined, and the safety standards which
have been issued reflect in great measure safety features which originated
within the industry and had already been incorporated in many vehicles." 8
Heffron noted" that in formulating a safety standard to protect the
public against "unreasonable risks of accidents" as required by Section 102 (1)
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 114. The Report expressed the "standards consensus"
when it stated:
Consumers are best protected when manufacturers build into their products safeguards
against all predictable forms of abuse or misuse. Toward this end, safety standards,
effectively enforced, are one of the important means of reducing unreasonable hazards
in consumer products. Id.

33

54

NATIONAL COMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, FEDERAL CONSUMER LEGISLATIoN: A STUDY OF
THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY, FLAMMABLE FABRIcs, Toys, AND HAZ-

SUBSTANCES PROGRAMS (1970) [hereinafter cited as HEFFRON STUDy].
Auto safety is regulated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§1381-1431 (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
36 Flammable fabrics at the time of the Heffron study were regulated under the Flammable
Fabrics Act of 1953, 15 U.S.C. §§1191-1204 (1970). Note 37 infra.
37 Hazardous substances at the time of the Heffron study were regulated under the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1261-73 (1970). Section 30(d) of the Consumer
Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §1279(d) (Supp. IV, 1974), provides that:
A risk of injury which is associated with consumer products and which could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by action taken under the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, or the Flammable
Fabrics Act may be regulated by the Commission only in accordance with the provisions of those Acts.
For a discussion of how the Commission has administered Section 30(d), see Note,
Section 30(d) Determinations: The CPSC's Choice of Law in Product Safety Regulation,
43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1211 (1975). Section 16 of the Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284 §16 (May 11, 1976) amends Section
30(d) by providing greater flexibility to the CPSC by permitting regulation under the CPSA
"if the Commission by rule finds that it is in the public interest to regulate such risk of
injury under this Act."
ARDOus

35

3

8

HEFFRON STUDY, supra

note 34, at 21.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
39 Id. at 22-23.
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of the National Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety Act of 1966,0 the Secretary
of Transportation was required by the Act to consider whether the standard
was "reasonable, [and] practicable."'" He concluded that these and other
statutory criteria tended to ensure that standards would not exceed existing
industry practices. He added that standards could never be written for the
approximately 15,000 parts of a modem automobile, most of which have
some relation to safety, and that therefore auto safety regulators would have
to rely on defect enforcement and consumer information programs. "Standard
setting", Heffron concluded, "alone cannot do the full job."' 2
Heffron, however, never really questioned that the standards process
was a major part of the product safety regulation. His report focused on the
means of "improving" the standards process by decreasing delay. Thus he
argued that informal rulemaking under Section 4(b) of the Administrative
Procedure Act'" (APA) was more desirable than formal rulemaking under
Section 7 and 8 of the APA" "where questions of public health and safety
are involved."' 5
Heffron's discussion of possible methods of assessing the effectiveness
of safety standards, while unusual in even questioning the necessity for such
an assessment, ironically also reflects the degree to which standards were an
element of faith rather than proof in the middle 1960's. He cited four possible
methods of assessing the effectiveness of standards:'I
(1) A reduction in injuries attributable to a standard or group of
standards;
(2) The extent to which vehicles have had to be altered to incorporate
requirements imposed by the statute;
(3) Internal changes in a manufacturer's organization to improve
vehicle safety; and,
(4) The level of safety achieved by a given standard within the constraints of the existing state of the art and technology.
He described a "preliminary effort to examine the safety standards
issued to date in terms of the extent to which they have compelled manufacturers to modify vehicles" and also cited "some data bearing upon injury
reduction."" He concluded that as to the first, the requirement in Section
40 15 U.S.C. §1391(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
411d. §1392(f)(3).
42 HEFFRON STuDY, supra note 34, at 30.
'6 5 U.S.C. §553(b) (1970).
"Id. §§557-58.
45 HEFRON STUDY, supra note 34, at 33-34.

16 Id. at 53.

Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
47 Id.atby53-54.
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102(h) of the National Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety Act of 19668
to base initial standards on existing standards made it "not surprising" that
the impact of the initial standards on the auto industry was "relatively minimal". He added, however, that "with few exceptions, later standards forced,
no greater change upon the manufacturers than had the initial standards,
although they were not subject to the same statutory and factual limitations."' 9
Of the 32 standards charted in Heffron's study, only five were characterized
as requiring manufacturers, accounting for a significant share of the market,
to make some significant engineering effort to comply."
When Heffron turned to consideration of the impact of standards on
reduction of death and injuries, however, he admitted that "it is difficult to
attribute reduction of injuries or accidents to a specific standard . . . . it
does not seem possible to say of any standard, 'but for the issuance of this
safety requirement by the Government, a particular reduction in injuries
and accidents would not have occurred.' "51 He then described several efforts
to "assess the payoffs of particular standards", but concluded that "the evaluation of these studies is beyond the scope of this report. It will be years before safety improvements approach their full impact. Approximately five
years is required before a particular vehicle improvement required by a
standard will be on 50 percent of the passenger vehicles on the highway."52
What is striking about this attempt to develop criteria to assess the
effectiveness of standards is that despite Heffron's finding that standards
generally simply ratify the industry's state of the art and technology, and the
difficulty in attributing injury reduction to standards, neither finding led
him to question the standards process as the most important approach to
product safety. Implicit is Heffron's faith that standards need not necessarily
simply ratify the state of the art, and that eventually there would be data
showing the "payoffs" of particular standards.
The degree of faith required is shown even more graphically in Heffron's
48

15 U.S.C. §1392(h) (Supp. IV, 1974).

49 HEFFRON STUDY, supra note 34, at 54.
50

51

Id. at 56-59. Heffron did note the limitations of his chart as follows:
Lack of reliable data prevents [the chart] from showing the extent to which the automobile manufacturers adopted safety features in anticipation of or, as some claim, in
an effort to forestall enactment of Federal legislation. Nor does it indicate the extent to
which manufacturers had been impelled to adopt safety features to provide grist for
the standard-setting process to foreclose or limit the possibility that other less obstrusive
requirements might be adopted. If the Federal program has succeeded in drawing safety
advances from industry for any of the foregoing reasons, these advances are genuine
accomplishments of credit to the program. Even so, by showing that the Bureau's
standards have up to now been predominantly adoptions of preexisting industry safety
features, the chart shows that the Bureau has not had a strong innovative role. Id. at 55.

Id.at 61.

52 Id.
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195

review of standards under the Flammable Fabrics Act,5" since he found
that standards under that Act were even less effective by any criteria than
the auto safety standards issued under the National Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966. Heffron states that "study after study showed that clothing involved in burns had consistently passed the CS 191-53 standard," 5 i.e. the
standard statutorily specified in the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953,
Section 4.55 That the statutory standard was written not to eliminate unreasonable risks from burns but to preserve the textile industry's markets
nearly intact became clear in the industry's opposition to proposals in 1967
to amend the 1953 Act by authorizing administrative issuance of new standards, which could, as Heffron noted, "potentially go so far as to ban all
flammable fabrics or textile products and require nonflammable products
in their place."" The 1967 amendments to the Flammable Fabrics Act ultimately adopted by Congress, did, despite the industry opposition noted by
Heffron, provide for administrative issuance by the Secretary of Commerce"
of new or amended flammability standards. Writing in 1970, however, Heffron found that administrative issuance had not resulted in stronger standards
that would eliminate unreasonable risks from flammable fabrics. He observed
that "[T]he lack of any meaningful action should come as no surprise,
[because of] cumbersome administrative procedures."" Thus once again,
Heffron did not analyze the problem as anything inherent in the standards
approach itself.
Since the 1953 Flammable Fabrics Act is generally recognized as the
first 59 modern federal product safety legislation, and since it established
safety standards as the federal government's primary approach to product
safety, it is instructive to reconsider the legislative background of that Act
for what it shows about the limitations of the standards approach.
5 15 U.S.C. §1191-1204 (1970).
54

HEFFRON STUDY, supra note 34, at 117.
55 Pub. L. No. 88 §4(a), 67 Stat. 112.
50 HEFFRON STUDY, supra note 34, at 118.
57
Prior to the passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, the Flammable Fabrics
Act was administered by three federal agencies: the Department of Commerce promulgated
flammability standards, the Federal Trade Commission enforced the Act, and the Department of. Health, Education and Welfare conducted research. 15 U.S.C. §§1193-95, 1197,
1201 (1970). Section 30(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §2097(b)
(Supp. IV, 1974), transferred the functions of the Secretary of HEW, the Secretary of Commerce, and the FTC under the Flammable Fabrics Act to the Consumer Product Safety Commission. For a discussion of Section 30(d) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, see note
37, supra.
58

HEFFRON STUDY, supra note 34, at 125.

59The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§301-92 (1970) of
course predates the Flammable Fabrics Act by 15 years. Historically, however, governmental
regulation of foods and drugs dates back to 1906 when the Pure Food and Drug Act was
passed. Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). Food and Drug regulation, therefore, is genPublished
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977 from modem product safety regulation.
erally considered
as a separate world
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Heffron's statement that industry groups supported the 1953 Act with
its statutory flammability standard" while true, fails to state an important
fact about the 1953 Act. The industry support referred to came only after
over seven years of development by the textile industry of what became the
"statutory" flammability standard. Also, this development was spurred by a
1945 California statute giving the California state fire marshal regulatory
power to "prescribe general and uniform regulations which will reduce the
risk of fire and hazard of injury to persons and property and at the same
time prevent serious and unnecessary economic injury to many California
citizens." 1
To fully appreciate the process by which industry came to support the
1953 Flammable Fabrics Act, it is necessary to consider in detail the hearings on "Inflammable Textiles" held by the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee on March 4 and 5, 1947.
II. THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON FLAMMABLE FABRICS, 1947
The March, 1947 Hearings, apparently the first to be held by a Congressional committee on flammable fabrics, or indeed on any hazardous consumer
product other than foods and drugs, considered three bills: H.R. 505, introduced by Rep. Gordon Canfield of New Jersey; H.R. 601, introduced by
Rep. Leroy Johnson of California, and H.R. 1111, introduced by Rep. Wat
Arnold of Missouri.
While the two major bills, the Johnson and Arnold Bills, both illustrate
the post-World War II climate of industry-government cooperation in the
name of public safety that has been at the heart of the standards approach
to product safety ever since, the Bills differed in several significant respects.
The Johnson Bill was a fairly simple but broad bill defining flammable
textile fabrics as burning at a stated rate, with testing to be in accordance
with National Bureau of Standards (NBS) procedures, and with enforcement by criminal penalties and injunctions. The Arnold Bill, while narrower
in its application only to wearing apparel, in contrast set up an elaborate
scheme whereby the retail industry, which according to Johnson "wrote and
sponsored"62 the Arnold Bill, would in effect write the testing requirements.
Johnson also criticized the Arnold Bill for permitting the marketing of
dangerously flammable fabrics intended for wearing apparel provided it was
marked "flammable-dangerous when worn", and noted that such a warning
label could provide the retailer with a products liability defense. 8

Go
HEFFRON

STUDY,

supra note 34, at 118.

61 1945 Cal. Stats. ch. 728, §10.
62 See text accompanying note 72 infra.
6- See text accompanying note 74 infra.
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Also evident in the 1947 Hearings is the importance of regulatory
activity at the state level (the California statute, passed at least partially in
response to public outcry and concern over the rash of fires6 ' in 1945 thought
to be connected with the new synthetic fibers which flooded the market at
the end of World War II) as a catalyst for industry to seek weaker federal

legislation as a means of preserving national markets for new synthetics."'
The testimony also reflects very well the conflicts within the textile industry,
particularly between cotton and the new synthetics, which delayed the pass-

age of the Flammable Fabrics Act for 6 years, i.e. until the industry had
developed a standard and testing method to determine compliance which all
segments of the industry could live with, and until another consumer product
disaster-exploding torch sweaters burning children-occurred in 1953,
and legislation was needed to reassure the public.
The 1947 Hearings are also important because they illustrate several
characteristics of a standards product safety regulatory approach which suggest that such an approach has little to do with consumer protection against
unreasonable risks. First, the standards approach lends itself to attempts by
certain segments of an industry to shift testing and liability costs either to
64 See, e.g., Fire Destroys the Big Top, LIFE, July 17, 1944, at 30 (the Hartford, Connecticut Circus Fire); You'd Better be Panic Proof: Essential Points to Remember in Today's
Jam-Packed Theaters, Restaurants, Dance Halls and Night Clubs, READER'S DIoEST, Dec.
1944, at 35-36 (citing the Coconut Grove fire in Boston in 1943 where 500 died; a fire in
a one room Oklahoma schoolhouse where a candle ignited the whiskers of a Santa Claus).
During the 1947 hearings on Inflammable Fabrics, infra note 66, Congressman William J.
Miller (Conn.) asked Congressman Leroy Johnson (Calif.) whether the California Flammable Fabrics Act of 1945 was "written in part because of the Coconut Grove fire in Boston", and mentioned that the Coconut Grove fire had a great deal of national publicity."
Johnson replied that he did not know what precipitated the writing of the 1945 California
Law and that "I never heard any connection between that fire and the passage of the Act."
1947 Hearings, infra note 66, at 15.
The years 1946 and early 1947, the period just prior to the 1947 Hearings on Inflammable Fabrics, also saw a rash of hotel fires, which were fully covered by the national press.
See, e.g., Atlanta: the Inferno, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1946, at 34 (the Atlanta, Georgia
Winecoff Hotel fire on Dec. 7, 1947: the story begins, "Her nightgown shone white against
the flames behind her as she stood on the window ledge, high above the street. Then it,
too, caught fire. She jumped. But she missed the net stretched by firemen. She landed
astride overhead wires. There she hung in flames. Finally her body broke loose and tumbled
to the ground."); Chicago Hotel Fire Kills 60 People, LIFE, June 17, 1946, at 29-33 (the
LaSalle Hotel fire); Firetrap U.S.A., COLLIERS, Sept. 21, 1946, at 16 (citing the Hartford
circus fire, the Chicago LaSalle Hotel fire and the Dubuque, Iowa Hotel Canfield fire which
killed a total of 80 within a one week period in the early summer of 1946, citing fire damage
to U.S. homes in 1945 of $120 million, and stating that the "death rate in homes right now
is 15 a day" Id. at 52); Germany: Costly Clothing, TIME, Feb. 17, 1947, at 34 (Berlin
Germany fancy-dress dance hall fire killing 84; witness quoted as saying, "for some reason,
....
most people seemed more concerned about their clothes than their lives."); Hotel
Fires: Experts Work to Prevent Repetition of Conflagrations of Last Year, the Worst in
Recent U.S. History, LIFE, Jan. 13, 1947, at 33 (citing 30 major hotel fires killing 272
persons).
65 It should be noted that the first federal bill introduced to regulate flammable fabrics Was
aimed at synthetics. See testimony of Rep. Johnson of California, referred to in text accom66, infra.
panyingbynote
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other parts of the industry or to consumers. Second, standards setting is inherently technologically retrogressive in that it tends to prohibit incorporation
into the standard a requirement that would stretch existing technology.
Finally, a standards approach may distract federal policymakers from other
approaches to product safety more directly concerned with eliminating unreasonable risks, such as public hcariags, defects notification, or requiring
companies to reform internal procedures to prevent and detect safety hazards.
The Johnson and Arnold Bills
Representative Johnson of California was apparently the first Congressman to become involved in federal regulation of flammable fabrics. He testified before the House Commerce Committee on March 4, 1947 that his
interest in flammable fabrics legislation was "aroused by a California editor
whose suggestions resulted in a law being passed by the California legislature
in 1945 curtailing the sale of dangerous fabrics." 6 Representative Johnson
noted that he had first introduced in the first session of the 79th Congress a
bill, H.R. 2496, regulating the safety of synthetic fibers, and then in the
second session of the 79th Congress added another bill, H.R. 5445, to prohibit movement in interstate commerce of dangerous flammable fabrics, both
synthetic and natural. While this latter bill was pending he held informal
meetings in his office with various manufacturing, retailing and testing organization representatives. He testified:
I asked the gentlemen present if they would be kind enough to furnish
me a yardstick or standard or formula which they thought appropriate
to place in the statute defining what was dangerous and the test to be
applied to determine what fabrics were dangerous ....
The group of technical men that I mentioned did not get around to
furnishing me a formula and consequently I turned to Mr. Ingberg of
the Bureau of Standards to furnish me what he thought was the appropriate phrasing of the yardstick to be placed in the statute.67
Rep. Johnson then described his new bill, H.R. 601, introduced in the
First Session of the 80th Congress, which he characterized as a "simple,
effective and economical bill" which would make unlawful the use of means
of instrumentalities of communication or transportation in interstate commerce for the purpose of selling, offering for sale, or for delivery after sale,
of any inflammable textile fabric. The bill provided criminal penalties,
authorized the Attorney General or U.S. attorneys to seek injunctions against
threatened violations, and most important, defined "flammable textile fabric"
as:
66

Hearings on H.R. 505, 601 & 1111 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess, at 9 (1947)

[hereinafter cited as 1947 Hearings].

67 Id.
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any textile fabric of combustible fibers which flashes or burns in horizontal position, with any nap or pile on the upper face, at greater average
rate than one inch per second, the size and condition of samples and
method of testing to be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
National Bureau of Standards Circular Numbered C455, entitled
"Flame-proofing of Textiles": Provided, That if flameproofing is applied to meet the requirements it shall be permanent for the life of the
textile.68
Johnson stressed that "in this matter you have a disinterested and
well-trained Federal agency determining what fabrics are dangerous. This
Bureau is an old well-established Bureau . . . . The cost of administration
of this act would be nominal." Johnson also emphasized the progressiveness
of the injunction remedy, and noted that his bill recognized that flameproofing is or may become effective and mentioned that "we had some informal
tests performed to determine the permanency of the flameproofed fabrics." 69
It is in his discussion of the other two bills, however, that the split within
the industry begins to become apparent. Johnson quickly dismissed the
Canfield Bill, H.R. 505 as "the same as my former bill, H.R. 5445, SeventyNinth Congress. ' 0
Representative Johnson then turned to H.R. 1111, the Arnold Bill, and
described its standard setting mechanism as follows:
68

H.R. 601, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §3(b) (1947).

60 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 10.

Id. Rep. Canfield in his testimony generally stressed the injuries to children from inflammable cowboy suits and "recent hotel fires causing hundreds of deaths, in which flammable
fabrics may have played a large part" as his motivation for introducing H.R. 505. Id. at 7.
He also stated his opposition to limiting regulation to wearing apparel. He introduced into
the record a telegram from a constituent whose child had been burned to death by one of
the cowboy suits, and also an article from Life magazine which devoted three pages to
"describing experiments on dummy manikins dressed in flammable fabrics." He quoted from
Life as follows:
Every year dozens of United States women manage to get themselves into much the
same predicament as the flaming dummy pictured herein. At gay dances and dinner
parties pretty girls in flimsy frocks brush against glowing cigarettes, or lighted candles
and suddenly discover that their most cherished party gowns have become firetraps. In
New York last December Debutante Virginia Black narrowly escaped death when she
ignited her flowing tulle dress by merely dancing over a cigarette carelessly tossed on
the floor. All this has caused a great stir among the Nation's dress manufacturers and
retailers, who consider it bad for business when their customers catch fire. Already
California has passed a law which makes it illegal to sell any fabric which burns faster
than 5 inches in 6 seconds. Similar Federal legislation now being pushed hard by retail
dry-goods organizations would ban such sales all over the country. To show what happens when a girl's party dress is set afire, a manikin was carefully dressed in yards
of gauzy rayon net, long a favorite party-dress fabric. Then a burning match was touched
to the skirt. Instantly the dress exploded into flames and in 14 seconds the dummy was
reduced to a smoking, sizzling ruin.
PublishedId.
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In Section 4 of H.R. 1111 is a sort of NRA set-up", for the handling
of this problem. The section provides that the testing prescribed shall
be the "then effective commercial standards." But the Department of
Commerce has not promulgated any such standard, although one has
been submitted by the National Retail Dry Goods Association, which
group wrote and sponsored H.R. 1111. (emphasis added.)
How do we know that the industry can agree upon a standard method
of testing? In 1933, 1 was the head of an NRA board, and I got a good
view of what a part of an industry could do to the rest of it under NRA
methods. Our bill simply applies the standards provided by the Bureau
of Standards which works closely with industry, but whose sole object
is to meet the danger, uninfluenced by either industry, consumers or anyone else. 2 (emphasis added.)
Johnson's general skepticism about the retailer-written Arnold Bill,
with its provisions for standards to be written by the "regulated" party,
extended one important step further to a recognition that an important aspect
71 Rep. Johnson's characterization of Section 4 of the Arnold
Bill as a "sort of NRA set-up
for the handling of this problem" suggests that the origins of the standards approach to
product safety regulation may be traceable to the NRA Codes. The author is conducting
preliminary research into the NRA Codes to ascertain whether the Code writers during the
New Deal concerned themselves with safety as well as the more generally known attempts
to write Codes of "fair competition" which were the primary focus of the NRA.
The writer thus far has found that some of the Codes had consumer advisory boards and
that one of the interests of these boards was safety. Safety concerns of such boards are
reflected in CONSUMER NOTES, Nos. 1-8, and THE CONSUMER,
(the successor to
CONSUMER NOTES), which were the official organs of the Consumer Division
of the National Emergency Council published for the County Consumer Councils. These Councils which
functioned under the direction of the Consumer Advisory Board of the NIRA and the Consumers Counsel of the Agricultural Assistance Administration, were "grass roots" organizations in
counties throughout the United States whose primary functions were adjusting of price
complaints, serving as channels for dissemination of information about the situation of the
consumer and ways of improving his position, acting as an agency through which consumers could be heard on questions of national economic recovery and public policy, and
aiding in the development of a more efficient and economical system of distributing goods
and services to consumers. Douglas. The Role of the Consumer in the New Deal: Toward
National Recovery, 172 ANNALS OF AM. AcAD. OF POL. & SociAL Sci. 98, 105 (1934). For
a general discussion of activities of the NIRA Consumer Advisory Board, see Keezer,
The Consumer Under the National Recovery Administration, id. at 88, 89. Further evidence
that the standards approach to safety regulation has its roots in NRA type administrative
structures and thinking can be found in the 1950 hearings on the Accident Prevention Act
of 1950, a proposal which would have created in the Department of Labor a Bureau of
Accident Prevention for the purpose of promoting and maintaining safe and healthful conditions of employment in hazardous industries affecting commerce. The administrative structure proposed was a tripartite joint board (4 management representatives, 4 labor representatives, and I public member) which would be empowered to set industrial safety standards
for industries whose injury rate exceeded the general industrial injury average. This structure
was denounced by industry opponents as a "pattern of Federal Code making and regulation
very similar to that under the National Industrial Recovery Act and found objectionable and
invalid by the Supreme Court." Letter of L. R. Sanford, President, Shipbuilders Council of
America, Hearings of H.R. 4997 Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1950).
72 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 11.
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of the Arnold Bill was the continued marketing of dangerously flammable
fabrics, combined with a products liability defense against injured users.
Johnson testified:
A curious provision of H.R. 1111 is Section 3 which permits the manufacture, sale and transportation in interstate commerce of any article
or fabric"3 intended as wearing apparel providing it is marked "flammable
-- dangerous when worn." Certainly this is a questionable provision.
It would be no comfort to have your wife or daughter buy some dangerously flammable material, make it into a dress or coat and then
after getting burned badly or fatally burned be confronted with the
defense that the material which had been bought was marked "flammable
-- dangerous, etc." You know that buyers would frequently not see the
marking and in many cases sellers would probably not go out of their
way to emphasize the marking on the material, as it might stop sales.7 "
Thus Johnson introduces two themes that pervade the 1947 HearingsNBS standards versus commercial standards, and the attempt by different
parts of the textile industry to shift liability burdens via "safety" legislation
based on standards. Both themes in turn are related to attempts by different
segments of the industry to preserve or increase market shares.
The testimony of S. H. Ingberg, Chief, Fire Resistance Section, Bureau
of Standards, illustrates very well the intertwining of the above themes.
Ingberg tested the various types of textiles (cotton chenilles, brushed rayons,
fleeced cotton fabrics, lightweight nets, and coated fabrics) under both the
testing methods prescribed in NBS Circular 455 (incorporated by reference
in the Johnson Bill) on the one hand, and in the retailer proposed commercial
standard TS-4315 (referenced into the Arnold Bill) on the other. Ingberg
stated that the NBS test, in which the testing equipment was placed in a
horizontal position and the ignition of the sample was on the edge rather
than the face of the sample, gave the most consistent and definite
determination of the rate of flame travel. 5 Applying the NBS test to the
different types of textiles proposed to7 be regulated under the Johnson and
Arnold Bills, the results were as follows: 1

Rep. Johnson slightly misinterprets the Arnold Bill, since only fabrics, i.e. piece goods, had
to carry the warning label if they failed the flammability test. H.R. 1111, 80th Cong., 1st
73

Sess. §3(a) (1947). If wearing apparel failed the flammability test, Section 3(b) of H.R.
1111 prohibited its manufacture or sale in interstate commerce. See further discussion in note
93 infra.
74 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 11.
7

5 Id. at 19.
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No. Classified as Highly Hazardous under NBS 455
Cotton chenilles
6 of 30 samples
Tufted textiles
0 of 10
Brushed rayons
1 of 12
Long napped rayons
0 of 2
Fleeced cotton fabrics
0 of 8
(2 flannels, 6 flannelettes)
Lightweight nets
3 of 5
Coated fabrics
1 of 3
Ingberg then compared these test results with the injury data that NBS
had received, and concluded, "the test and limit of flame spread proposed
appear to segregate fairly faithfully the general types of textiles involved in
the accidents of which reports were received." 7 He then related the
"standards" theme to the "products liability" theme as follows:
77

Id. at 21.

Id. Ingberg's hope that federal safety standards would conclusively establish the standard
of care in products liability litigation has not been realized since, as stated in the FINAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 76:
The effect of safety standards on common-law liability has never been uniformly resolved. Proof that the defendant failed to meet mandatory Federal, State, or local
standards will, in many jurisdictions, be conclusive evidence of negligence or of a defect
under strict tort principles. Other courts treat such proof simply as "some evidence"
of lack of due care.
The manufacturer's evidence that he complied with a statutory standard does not prove
he used due care or that his product had no defect, since the standard is usually minimal. While compliance should be evidence, the court must still decide whether commonlaw requirements are in fact higher than a standard of uncertain merit. Judge Learned
Hand observed, "A whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices . . . . There are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their ornmission" (citing The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740
[2d Cir. 1932]). Thus a manufacturer was recently found liable despite his compliance
with the Flammable Fabrics Act standard because the standard was insufficient (citing
LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 378 [W.D. Pa. 1967], affd., 407 F.2d 671
[3d Cir. 1969]).
Cases decided since 1970 do not materially alter the above conclusions of the Final Report,
although a recent article cites the LaGorga case, noted above, and Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973) as support for the statement that "defendants in
strict liability actions recently have asserted the defense that compliance with federal fabrics
standards negates the 'unreasonably dangerous' or 'defects' requirement of Section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS". Campbell & Vargo, The Flammable Fabrics
Act and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1976). The Raymond case is
particularly important for its rejection of defendant's argument that the 1967 amendments
to the Flammable Fabrics Act, providing that "this chapter is intended to supercede any law
of any state . . . inconsistent with its provisions," 15 U.S.C. §1203 (1970), prevent an
action based upon Section 402A or upon any other theory of recovery. The First Circuit
analyzed the history of the 1967 amendments as follows:
The legislative history indicates that the 1967 amendments which included the "supremacy clause" were, as a group, intended to increase the protection of consumers. The
amendments were designed to permit the Secretary of Commerce "to continually update flammability standards to keep pace with new technological processes developed
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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The need of the legislation is apparent not only as a forward step in
the slow progress of achieving greater safety, but also in setting up a
standard that will indicate the respective rights of those suffering injury
and those held responsible therefor. (emphasis added.)
It is perhaps known to you that there are pending cases aggregating
large sums, or have been settled, due to injuries as a result of the buming of these fabrics and this legislation will be of material assistance in
that the parties concerned have a standard to which they can refer. It
is quite likely that the courts will regard a standard recommended by
this committee and passed by the Congress as being authoritative in
the field. (emphasis added.)
It should also be noted that the legislation would be in large measure
educational as concerns both the producer and consumer. It is perhaps
apparent that if the present information had been extant some years past
some of the lines of textiles involved in accidents here indicated would
not have been produced. A statute in this field, even if it is found
necessary to invoke it only infrequently, would serve to hold the rather
costly ground that has been gained. 9 (emphasis added.)
It is with the presentation of the test results on the various textile fabrics
because legislative action was required, no new standards had been promulgated for
fourteen years. By creating a means for the Secretary of Commerce to make revision
through administrative process, the Congress hoped to facilitate an improvement of the
applicable standards which were then thought to be deficient. We note that at the
time of this case the standards had not as yet been updated. 484 F.2d 1025, 1027
(1st Cir. 1973).
See also Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Service, 16 Ill. App. 3d 339, 306 N.E.2d 312
(1973), rejecting defendant's argument that its cleaner had not been shown to be toxic
since its report submitted to the U.S. Poison Control Center stated the cleaner was non-toxic
under the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §1261-74 (1970). The
court stated:
Although compliance with a relevant statutory scheme declaring whether defendant must
warn of the dangers of its product is some evidence that the Jetco cleaner is not harmful
or toxic, such compliance is not conclusive or controlling in defining defendant's common law liability for failure to warn. 16 Ill. App. 3d at 345, 306 N.E.2d at 316.
As for the defendant's failure to meet mandatory standards as negligence per se, this still
apparently is the majority American rule. At least one state, Arkansas, which since 1915
had followed the minority rule that violation of a safety statute is only evidence of negligence, has in the case of Smith v. Aaron, 256 Ark. 414, 508 S.W.2d 320 (1974) apparently
moved closer to the majority rule by holding that "when a legislative enactment . . . prescribes the minimum standards for the safety of an employee in mandatory language, then
such requirements supersede and render irrelevant any evidence as to custom and usage."
Id. at 416, 508 S.W.2d at 321. For a student note interpreting Smith more narrowly as
restricting a negligence per se rule to cases involving violations of statutes which set out
safety precautions for the protection of employees, see Note, Torts-Negligence: Effect of
Violation of Safety Statutes on the Admissibility of Evidence of Custom and Industry
Standards, 28 ARK. L. REV. 399 (1974).
79 The final paragraph of Ingberg's statement is an unusual early statement of a theory that
the mere existence of a federal standard acts as a deterrent to manufacture of dangerous
products. Empirical verification of such a theory, however, is lacking. Also, Ingberg's recognition of the symbolic value of standards may indicate the use of federal legislation as a
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using the testing method in the retailer sponsored proposed commercial standard referenced in by the Arnold Bill, however, that the interests of the
retailers can be seen diverging from the interests of those manufacturers
who backed the Johnson Bill."
Ingberg described the commercial standard test method as follows:
A sample of the cloth, conditioned for 15 minutes at 220 degrees
Fahrenheit and after cooling for not less than 5 minutes in a desiccator,
is mounted on a grid at 45 degrees and a butane flame from a microburner applied to the upper surface near the lower end for one second.
In case of ignition, the time is taken for the flame to burn a thread
across the upper end of the sample, about 5 inches from the point of
flame application. A fabric is indicated as highly hazardous if the
average time for 5 or 10 samples is less than 6 seconds, or for an
individual specimen less than 5 seconds.81
The results of applying the 45 degree testing method to the various fabric
were as follows:82
No. Classified as Highly Hazardous under CS 4315
Cotton chenilles
29 of 30 samples
Tufted textiles
10 of 10
Brushed rayons
6 of 12
Long napped rayons
2 of 2
Fleeced cotton fabrics
3 of 3
Lightweight nets
4 of 5
Coated fabrics
1 of 3
When these results are compared with the results under the NBS horizontal test method (the Johnson Bill), it is obvious that the retailer sponsored
commercial standard is more severe. At first blush it may appear anomalous
that retailers would be proposing a test that would eliminate many fabrics
80

The Johnson Bill was particularly protective of the interests of plastics manufacturers, as
shown by its failure to regulate "articles of wearing apparel" in addition to "textile fabrics."
(In contrast, the Arnold Bill regulated both articles of wearing apparel and fabrics). Thus
buttons, for example, were excluded from the Johnson Bill. Rep. Johnson testified that
"no important or dangerous burns have been reported-as far as I can ascertain-as being
due to the burning of buttons, brooches, etc." 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 10. Plastics
industry spokesmen similarly testified that buttons, bracelets and other articles of personal
adornment should not be regulated since "those items are not considered to be hazardous
because of their small size. Moreover, they are difficult to ignite." Statement of Dr. Foster
D. Snell, Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc., Id. at 109. In contrast, retailer spokesmen
gave examples of individual instances of buttons or other clothing accessories made from
plastics exploding. See, e.g., Testimony of Charles Dorn, National Retail Dry Goods Association, cited in note 92 infra; statement of Dr. Frederic Bonnet, National Retail Dry
Goods Ass'n, 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 82.
81 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 22.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
82 Id. at 23.
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and hence reduce retail sales of textiles. While an altruistic explanation is
possible, i.e. the retailers were the consumer protectors of their day,8" close
examination of the provisions of the Arnold Bill show that the retailers'
primary purpose was to continue selling the fabrics that failed the 45 degree
test with a warning, and then use the warning as a products liability defense
in the event of injury. Thus, the "piece goods" market would be preserved,
except to the extent the warning reduced demand,8" and the retailers would
be shielded by the warning from liability. As for wearing apparel made of
fabrics which failed the 45 degree test, it is true that the Arnold Bill in
Section 3(a) appears to prohibit manufacture or sale, rather than simply
requiring a warning label. The primary economic impact of this section,
however, falls on the manufacturer, since it is he who must test. Thus, the
overall impact of the Arnold Bill is to shift products liability and testing
costs away from retailers, while at the same time limiting marketability as
little as possible (i.e. only wearing apparel which fails manufacturer run
tests.)
However, the Arnold Bill was not the only bill which had market
preservation aspects for its sponsors. The Johnson Bill, while superficially
stricter than the Arnold Bill in that it prohibited sale of fabrics failing the
NBS horizontal test, rather than merely requiring labeling as in the Arnold
Bill, in turn has little market impact since very few fabrics fail the horizontal
test. Congressman Virgil Chapman (Ky.) therefore questioned whether the
horizontal testing method in the Johnson Bill was "rigid enough for the protection of the public." Ingberg's reply shows very clearly the thrust of the
Johnson Bill to preserve markets:
We have made tests of the range of ordinary napped or fleeced textiles
that have been in the trade for a matter of 50, perhaps 100 years. There
have been fires with them, yes; but they have been accepted with whatever hazards are associated with them.
It is a question at this time whether we can go so far as to impose
restrictions on these types of textiles that are produced in very large
volume, relatively low cost, and for which at this time we have no full
assurance that permanent flameproofing processes can be practically
applied in course of manufacture, at least perhaps not without increasing
83 Testimony by retailer spokesmen at the 1947 Hearings did attempt to depict their industry
in strongly consumer protectionist terms. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
84 Ingberg testified that "[o]f course, any labeling as to 'highly hazardous' is going to affect

the demand for the fabric. Whether or not it will affect the demand to the extent that the
fabric will be automatically eliminated would be a matter of experience." 1947 Hearings,

supra note 66, at 27. Compare Johnson's statement, cited in the text accompanying note 73
supra, that buyers would frequently not see the marking and sellers would not go out of

their way to emphasize the marking. The total silence of the retailer spokesmen on any

impact of the warning on demand for piece goods probably indicates that they were not
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977 than Ingberg was correct.
too worried,
and that Johnson rather
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costs beyond the point where it would put them out of the picture from
the standpoint of demand.85
The implication in Ingberg's statement that a standard has to wait on new
technology" (flameproofing) that will preserve markets is an early recognition
of a significant limitation on the standards approach to product safety-its
dependence on existing technology.
Congressional anxiety about imposing standards too far in advance of
technology in turn prompted questions in the 1947 Hearings about whether
regulation by standard setting could ever provide the certainty thought necessary in private litigation, particularly in the light of unceasing efforts by
different segments of the industry involved to use the proposed legislation to
place economic loss from dangerous fabrics either on other segments of the
industry or on the consumer-in short, anywhere but on themselves.
The following colloquy between Congressman Henderson H. Carson
(Ohio) and Ingberg sounds all the themes mentioned in the preceding paragraph:
Carson:

Ingberg:
Carson:

. . . . Do you think we could enact any legislation with such
certainty that the courts could take judicial notice as to whether
or not there had been a violation?
A violation would be based on the tests of the textile involved
under the provisions of any legislation that you would adopt.
Are we not flirting with considerable trouble, particularly in this
type of legislation, where we attempt to regulate anything? We

1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 27.
flameproofing methods were presently available at a reasonable
price raged throughout the hearings. Compare the statement of Dr. H. E. Hager cited in
text accompanying note 99 infra, that "the chemical companies have developed (such flame
resistant compounds)" with the testimony of the cotton converters spokesmen cited in text
accompanying note 96 infra, that permanent flameproofing still presented "technical problems" to solve. See also Testimony of Charles Dorn, National Retail Dry Goods Association, cited in note 93 infra, that the Johnson Bill requirement that the fire protective treatment last the life of the fabric is "not possible under today's conditions"; testimony of
Leonard Smith and Robert Jackson, National Cotton Council of America, 1947 Hearings,
supra note 66, at 69 ("Much of the support for this legislation is based on the belief that
adequate flameproofing techniques are available for use. On the contrary, however, there
is at the present time no finishing treatment available for cotton or rayon which will render
these articles permanently flameproof and still leave the material in a suitable state for
use as wearing apparel. There is one process which is reputed to be effective and permanent,
but to date it has not been produced or applied on a commercial scale."); testimony of Dr.
Frederic Bonnet, Technical Committee of the National Dry Goods Association and American Viscose Corp., Id. at 85 ("When you take some of this material which has been treated
-and
it is a commercial treatment, and a very large scale operation has been tried in
Georgia just within the past week or so-you will notice here that when I put this candle
on this material it just will not burn. Nothing happens, except that it chars. I do not think
I am telling any state secrets when I say at this time that some of the larger companies
like the duPont Co., the Cyanimid Co., are developing materials which are coming into
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
22
the market, which should certainly go a long way toward eliminating the hazard.")
85

86 The issue of whether

Jackson: The Federal Government and Safety

Fall, 1976]

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SAFETY

find always that perhaps we have not gone far enough in many
instances, and we come back to this one conclusion, that regardless of how the fire occurs, there is always going to be a question
of fact for determination by a jury as to whether the garment was
manufactured or processed according to the standards that you
set down?
We are going to get into considerable difficulties along that line,
just along the line you say, as to whether it is going to be the
liability of a common carrier, contract carrier, or the manufacturer in the first instance, the jobber, or the seller ....
Of course, I am very much concerned with safety ... But unless

we can get down to some basic principle that we can establish
a law with such certainty, or such definiteness that a court is
going to take judicial notice when that case appears in there, that
there has been or has not been a violation, we are going to have
considerable difficulty especially when you say here, the $64
question, in my mind, "is there any process that can be practically
adopted?" There is still a question in your mind, is there not?
Ingberg: Yes. Any legislation on this will run undoubtedly into difficulties.
But it will also resolve some difficulties.
Carson:
Definitely, it will.
Ingberg: Today there are pending any number of suits on which there is
a very great difficulty for the court, or for the jury, to find a
basis for a determination.
Now, I expressed the hope that the provisions of any statute that
meets the approval of this committee, and meets the approval of
Congress, will have sufficient standing so that it will serve as a
basis of adjudicating such cases. It will serve as a protection for
the party injured as well as for the one that is being held responsible for the injury.8"
The rest of the 1947 Hearings were concerned with the "difficulties" Rep.
Carson mentioned, rather than any attempt to realize Ingberg's hopes that
a legislative safety standard would provide certainty in adjudicating private
litigation.
Some of the "difficulties" alluded to by Rep. Carson surfaced immediately in the 1947 Hearings with the testimony of Charles Dorn, Chairman of
the Technical Committee of the National Retail Dry Goods Association.
Dorn began his testimony by describing the Arnold Bill as representing "the
ultimate in public service on the part of the manufacturing and distributive
trades."88 He stated that all of the individuals and organizations involved89
87 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 38.
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"have interested themselves in this subject solely for the purpose of stopping
the useless waste of human life caused by flammable wearing apparel and

fabrics."
Having set forth this "consumer protection-public service" theme, however, Dorn quickly revealed that the fear of state legislation was the real
reason the retailers were seeking federal regulation of flammable fabrics:
I know that most of you men, as well as most members of the business
fraternity, strongly support the principle of states rights. The National
Retail Dry Goods Association has always felt that America grew strong
because of the sovereignty of the individual states, and has opposed in
the past efforts that would have placed in the hands of the federal government jurisdiction over matters that could have been and were handled
with greater efficiency and less cost at the state level. However, in this
instance, it is our firm belief that the opposite is the case.
As an example, we have been reliably informed that no less than 23
state legislatures have been studying the subject of flammable fabrics
with a view toward enacting legislation on the subject. One state,
California, has already passed and has placed in operation legislation
directed toward this problem.
Can you conceive of the confusion that would exist if the several
states were to legislate on this important subject? There would be no
guarantee of uniformity and the chances are that each of the states
would place different provisions in their acts. If such a condition were
to exist, it would probably bring about not only mass confusion, but
mass unemployment in the textile, cutting up, and manufacturing
trades. 0
Dorn then briefly described the Arnold Bill as prohibiting the introduction into commerce of wearing apparel 1 and articles of personal adornment
89 The "individuals and organizations involved" were listed by Dorn as "the technical committee of the National Retail Dry Goods Association, with the support, advice and counsel

of the American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists, weavers and finishers of
textiles, manufacturers of synthetic yarns, manufacturers and fabricators of plastics, and
retailers both large and small." The cotton industry is conspicuously absent. Id.
90 Id. at 40-41.

91 The following exchange between Dorn and Congressman Carl Hinshaw of California
illustrates very well the contrast between the retailer desire to narrowly define a safety
problem to the particular goods they are dealing with (i.e. wearing apparel and piece goods)
and their resultant products liability exposure, on the one hand, and a more epidemiologically

oriented approach such as Hinshaw's which would seek broad safety legislation protecting users
against fire risks from multiple sources:
Mr. Hinshaw: I notice that . . . your bill apparently covers only articles that will be worn.
What about other items of household equipment that are highly flammable?
Mr. Dorn:

Mr. Hinshaw:

For example, you are referring to curtains?

Curtains and rugs and fabrics that are used for furniture covering, bedspreads and such.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
Mr. Dorn:
Our primary interest in this bill was to save human life where a person24
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such as buttons that were highly flammable,92 and as providing for warning
labels on piece goods which did not pass the test established in the referencedin commercial standard. 3 He then immediately set forth another important
aspect of the Arnold Bill-shifting the testing burden from retailers to manufacturers-by arguing
The hundreds and thousands of retail outlets in the country could not
be called upon to test each garment that they receive from their resources, so this bill accomplishes our purpose in not only the most
effective, but the easiest way-it prohibits the manufacture and introduction into commerce of dangerously flammable garments.9"
Thus, despite the consumer protection facade, it is apparent that the retailers'
is in a garment and cannot get out of it, if it catches on fire.
If a lace curtain catches on fire a person can walk away from it. If, for
instance, a blanket can catch on fire in a bed, and while there are many
people burned to death through smoking in bed they can easily throw the
cover back and get away from it. But if they are in a garment there is
no chance of getting out if it burns rapidly.
Mr. Hinshaw: There are likely to be short circuits in houses through faulty wiring, that can
cause similar difficulty. If articles that come in contact with it are not highly
flame resistant the flame will progress ....
Is it not advisable to consider that, also?
Mr. Dorn:
Yes, sir. But we have not considered those things in . . . this particular
piece of legislation.
Mr. Hinshaw: Is there anything about the manufacture of those items that they cannot
be readily flameproofed?
Mr. Dorn:
No, I believe that they can be treated just as well as the wearing apparel.
Mr. Hinshaw: Should they not be so treated?
Mr. Dorn:
That is a question I would rather refer to some of our technical people
that are going to follow.
Mr. Hinshaw: Very well.
1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 46-47.
92 Dorn's testimony generally stressed the flammability hazards connected with buttons. For
example, he testified, "To realize that an innocent appearing button may be the cause of
death or of the horrible maiming of an individual is hard to comprehend, but my associates
will show you shortly just how dangerous an innocent appearing button can be." 1947
Hearings, supra note 66, at 41. He later stated, "I can tell you, however, that there was a
very serious accident in Minnesota from pyroxylin buttons where a woman was terribly
disfigured." Id. at 43. Compare testimony by Rep. Johnson and plastics manufacturers on
the lack of injury data on buttons, cited in note 80 supra.
93 Dorn's testimony makes clear that the purpose of the Arnold Bill is to shift all economic
burdens connected with flammable fabrics away from retailers. Thus under the Arnold
Bill, manufacturers have to test finished goods, i.e. wearing apparel; on piece goods, the
burden is shifted to consumers to read the warning label. Even more important, the Arnold
Bill would shift such burdens without eliminating significant types and numbers of textiles
from the market. Dorn estimated that only 1-2 percent of textiles by poundage of fiber
would be covered by the Arnold Bill. 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 46. On the latter
point, he contrasted the Johnson Bill provision that for fabrics treated with fire protective
treatment, the treatments last for the life of the fabric. Such a requirement, he testified,
is not possible under today's conditions. We do have treatments available that are
relatively permanent, but no one knows that they will last the life of the fabric. That
bill, as worded, would automatically take out of the market today all cotton blankets,
all rayon blankets, and many of our lace curtain materials that are hung in the windows.
Id. at 45.
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support for the Arnold Bill rested primarily on the fact that it preserved their
economic interests at every point.
In contrast, opposition to the Arnold Bill, and indeed to any federal
regulation, immediately surfaced at the 1947 Hearings from the segments
of the textile industry which would have had to bear the economic burdens
of the legislation. The Textile Fabrics Association, a trade association composed primarily of converters" of cotton textiles, opposed all legislation on
the grounds that such legislation was "premature" because there was not
yet "an accurate, reliable and accepted method of testing" in existence. The
Association's spokesman stressed that permanent flameproofing still presented
"technical problems" to solve, and besides, "a particularly cogent reason for
deferring this legislation is that only a very small percentage of all textiles
are flammable."96 He concluded that "hasty, ill-advised legislation, imposing
restrictions which may cause irreparable damage to the many thousands of
large, medium and small firms engaged in the textile and apparel industries,
should not be approved."9 7
The converters' argument that flammable fabrics legislation was "premature" because of lack of a reliable testing method seems weak in the light
of the testimony of Dr. H. E. Hagar of the American Association of Textile
Chemists and Colorists. Dr. Hagar described the tests underlying the proposed commercial standard (i.e., the standard referenced into the Arnold
Bill) as follows:
In conducting these tests we employed an automatic testing device
which we developed in the course of our research and a carefully worked
out method by which it is now possible to accurately evaluate not only
the rate of burning of a fabric but also the ignition rate to which it is
subject when exposed to flame.
Thereby, it is now entirely feasible not only from a scientific standpoint
but from a commercial standpoint to differentiate between dangerous and
safe textiles and textile commodities. The automatic testing machine to
which I have adverted has been accepted as a proposed commercial
standard having been approved by many hundreds of leading textile
interests.98
95 The Textile Fabrics Association spokesmen described converters as follows:

The converter purchases grey goods from the mill, determines how the goods should

be finished and designed, has them finished in accordance with his specifications, and
sells and distributes the finished goods to various end users. Id. at 48.
96 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 48-49.
97 Id.
98 d. at 57. Later in his testimony, Dr. Hager gave the following evidence of the reliability

of the testing method used in the proposed commercial standard:
[T]his tester . . . which the United States Testing Co. constructed for us according to
our specifications, is not just a fly-by-night affair which has given us some indication

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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Dr. Hagar estimated that the "area of dangerously flammable textiles appears
to be confined to fabrics of certain construction, which represent approximately 11

% of the total production of textile fabrics . .

.

.and even these

can now be rendered satisfactorily flame resistant if treated with certain
chemical compounds which the chemical companies have developed since
the inception of our work."'" He then concluded that "the Bill I 11 will not
constitute a hardship on the manufacturer outside of a minor increase in
cost."'",
That the manufacturers, particularly of cotton textiles, were unwilling
to absorb such costs became clear with the testimony of Leonard Smith and
Robert Jackson of the National Cotton Council of America, representing
cotton farmers, cotton ginners, cotton warehousemen, cottonseed crushers,
cotton merchants and cotton spinners. Smith and Jackson opposed any flammability legislation on three grounds: (1) the measures would accomplish
nothing in practice since adequate flameproof finishes were not available;
(2) lack of an adequate standard of flameproofness and an adequate method of
testing, and (3) "the extreme difficulty of administering the proposed
measures."'' On the latter point, they observed that none of the three bills
specified "which of the firms along the route from raw fiber to final consumer
shall bear the responsibility for the flameproofness of the article."' 2 Nor
was the Council concerned only about placement of responsibility for flameproofing. Jackson and Smith stated:
Any flameproofing treatments which show promise of having permanency at all will probably cost on the average of 10 cents a yard for
the finishing alone on the average type of fabric used in clothing. When
this cost goes through the usual mark-ups customary in the marketing
of textile goods, the increase in cost to the consumer is likely to amount
to as much as several dollars per garment.'
Other considerations of cost reverberate throughout the Council's testimony. For example, Jackson and Smith cited the Arnold Bill requirement that
persons engaged in producing, manufacturing, converting or finishing of
regulated articles maintain necessary records as "placing an undue hardship
on all involved and would add much unnecessary expense."104
we had seven more built and sent them out to seven laboratories in different parts of
the country, and we were very much elated when on the same fabric the same results
were obtained on all of these seven machines. Id. at 67.
9 ld. at 57-58.
100 Id. at 58.

10 1Id. at 69-70.
102 Id. at 70.
1o

ld. at 71.

104 Id. atby72.
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Perhaps the most striking cost analysis was the Council's observation
that enforcement of the Arnold Bill:
can only be accomplished by setting up extensive laboratories for testing, and by training and maintaining large groups of technologists
throughout the country to make sure that all fabrics covered by the law
will pass the required specifications. . . . Without adequate laboratories
and extensive policing, enforcement would be out of the question. On
the other hand, adequate laboratories and policing would mean a real
expense to the taxpayer and a drain upon needed technical personnel." 5
In the final analysis, however, cotton industry opposition to flammable
fabrics legislation boiled down to the liability question, expressed as "who is
going to do the marking or labeling."' ° This comes out most clearly in the
testimony of Dr. Frederic Bonnet of the American Viscose Co. and a member
of the technical committee of the National Dry Goods Association. Bonnet
was asked by Rep. Carl Hinshaw (Calif.) whether any members of the cotton
industry had been involved in the development of the proposed commercial
flammability standard and testing method. Bonnet replied generally that while
some cotton industry representatives were at some of the meetings, he did
not think they "went along with some of the work as far as the bill went."
1 °7
The following exchange then occurred:
Mr. Hinshaw:

Dr. Bonnet:

Mr. Fishbach:0

a

I wondered if the standards that you intended to promulgate were such that the cotton people could not quite agree
with them, and if that is why they were opposing them.
Dr. Hagar and I went around to a meeting of the finishers
and thought we were going to be taken to task on the
thing. They said no, 'No, we think the test is a fine test, and
the machine you worked out is a fine machine. But what
we want to do is know who is going to do the labeling'...
Now where is the responsibility for marking, so as to qualify
this merchandise to move in commerce? The responsibility
lies upon the individual who causes them to move in commerce for the purpose of sale.
If the owner of the merchandise turns the goods loose to
a processor for processing, and the result of the application

Id.
106 The cotton industry was not the only segment of the textile industry which opposed
legislation which put the labeling responsibility upon it. The Pyroxylin and Resin Coaters
Institute, a trade association representing manufacturers of coated fabrics, opposed the Arnold
Bill because it would "make it necessary for the coating industry to label a great deal of
material which could not, because of its very nature, be used for garment purposes, or because of its use could not be considered a fire hazard." 1947 Hearings, supra note 66,
at 117.
107 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 89-90.
208 Mr. Fischbach was the general counsel for the National Retail Dry Goods Association. 28
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of the process is to render them unsafe, and then the
owner of the merchandise causes them to move in commerce for sale or delivery after sale without being marked
"Flammable-dangerous when worn" he is guilty of a violation of this law.
On the other hand, if he causes them to move in commerce
without labeling for the purpose of rendering them safe,
by further processing such as flameproofing, then he is
not guilty of a violation of the law because he is not moving
them in commerce for purpose of sale, he is moving them
for the purpose of further treatment.
That is the concept that underlies the legislative standard
here.
Rep. Carson:
That clears it up. I did not know where the responsibility
was going to be on this. We had to have somebody
responsible before we could go in and make this applicable
and effective.
The final major industry group to testify on the proposed legislation was
the Cotton Textile Institute, representing the manufacturing end of the
cotton textile industry. The Institute's President, Dr. Claudius Murchison,
perhaps put most succinctly the "we don't want to bear the economic costs"
reason for opposing all of the bills:
And, we feel that upon our group, under any one of the three bills,
would fall the responsibility of carrying out the provisions of the act
and upon us would be the major liability in the event liabilities develop
and upon us would fall the major incidence of punishment in the
event that punishment evolves."0 9
Dr. Murchison generally stressed the user negligence factor in fabric burns
injuries, belittled burns in general as "relatively low in importance" and
ridiculed the consumer protection pretensions of the retailers as follows:
It is my belief that far more people die from falling off stepladders, in
the home, or falling down the cellar stairs, or slipping in the bathtub,
than from apparel burns which are due primarily to the inherent
flammability of the fabric. Yet so far as I know, not even the National
Retail Dry Goods Association has pressed for laws protecting their
customs (sic) who shuffle off the mortal coil in these undignified ways.
Can it be that those who die in this fashion have no basis for damage
suits?" °
Dr. Murchison then described the complexity of the textile industry, and
concluded with the following description of the retailers' role:
109 1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 123.
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Under modem methods of merchandising a very large percentage
of the final finishing operation and the final fabrication of the garment
is on specifications contained in the order from the retailers, and many
-great retail establishments take particular pride in the fact that their goods
are distinctive, in that they themselves had determined the fixed
characteristics of the fabrics and the fashion characteristics of the
garment.
That relationship between the processing division of the industry and
the retailer is becoming more and more important, so that the retailer
himself has finally reached the stage where he must, of necessity have
a very high degree of responsibility of the goods which he sells. In
many cases, he is the author of those goods, in the sense of their
character and their quality.
Yet the retailers in H.R. 1111 are not even referred to. The word does
not appear in the entire bill.
The sum total of all of the obligations and of all of the liabilities are
imposed upon those tens of thousands of processors in connection with
whom no enforcement agency that could conceivably be set up could
follow through with the proper identification and placement of responsibility.
And it would mean hundreds of thousands of testing machines at
every level of the industry. It would mean testing operations at every
new stage in the forward movement of the goods, with those occurring
so numerously and under such unlike conditions, that for the end result
to be a result exactly measurable in terms of statutory requirements,
it would be totally impossible.'11
"'

Id. at 128. Murchison also gave the following graphic example of the effect of the

Arnold Bill in shielding retailers from liability claims:
I am going to assume a hypothetical lady, we will just call her Mrs. Montague, for the
purpose of identification.
She walks into a department store and we will assume that this legislation has been
passed, H.R. 1111. She buys some outing flannel . . . . takes it home, makes it up into
a garment. Then an accident happens and she goes back to the retailer and says, "Mr.
Kline, this cloth which I bought from you caught fire and I am going to sue you. I
am going to ask you for a settlement or I am going to sue you for damages, or have you
indicted under the law."

Mr. Kline would say, "Well, Madam, these fabrics are under Federal legislation. This
piece of goods was sold to you marked 'flammable, dangerous when worn'; you bought

it with that notice. You bought it at your own risk. If you have been burned, you have
been legally burned. You have no recourse under the law." And, would she have?

But, Mrs. Montague is an aggressive person. She refuses to give up, and so goes back
to the store . . . and she buys a fabric which is not marked and she takes it home and
the accident occurs. She could go back to the store, to Mr. Kline and say, "Mr. Kline,
that fabric caught fire. I was severely burned. I will seek my rights under the law."
Mr. Kline will say, "Mrs. Montague, you cannot do that. All of these fabrics are under
Federal legislation. Under the law as set-up this fabric is declared to be, by the United
States Government, non-flammable. You have no recourse." And gentlemen, would
she have?

Now, take the third case of a garment. Mrs. Montague this time buys a sweater; a

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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Dr. Murchison estimated the economic impact of the proposed legislation
on the cotton industry at 500,000 bales/year, or 12 percent of the total
yearly use for apparel purposes of four million bales." 2 He hinted darkly
that the effect of the legislation would be to replace cotton fabrics with
synthetics." 3 He also noted that "under this law, one of the crazy things
about it we object to, we might be producing a million yards of a particular
fabric, 25 yards might go into apparel, but the whole business would have to
be marked. It has to be inspected and marked, and its marketability is
affected.""'
Another Cotton Textile Institute representative, George Whalen, criticized the retailers as "never giving an indication of a willingness to cooperate
with the rest of the industry to find any solution to the problem than
legislation."" 5 A number of the final witnesses at the hearing similarly
argued that the industry would solve the flammability problem by voluntary
efforts if Congress abstained from passing "restrictive" legislation."'
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STANDARDS APPROACH TO
PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION

The 1947 Hearings did not result in federal flammable fabrics legislation. The House Commerce Committee never reported out a bill and
the Senate Commerce Committee did not even hold hearings on flammable
fabrics legislation until 1952. While the reasons for the House Commerce
Committee's inaction can only be speculated upon 28 years later, the
writer believes it likely that the cotton industry's opposition to legislation,
together with the factual disputes over the reliability of the various proposed
testing methods and the availability of flameproofing probably doomed
legislation in 1947. A contributing factor may have been that the textile
fire, and she has great difficulty in pulling it over her head. She is severely burned.
But again she is told that she bought it with due warning. Id. at 128-29.
Later in his testimony, Murchison gave his solution-put liability on the retailer. He stated:

[T]he flammability characteristic of the fabrics is changing and if it is the wish of the

committee to make this inspection and enforcement of the law simple, there is only one
way it can be done and that is to put the responsibility on the final handler of the
product; the retailer is the only one who has in his possession the net composite and
sum total results of everything that has happened before. Id. at 139.
Cotton consumption for all purposes per year was estimated by Murchison at 10 million
bales. 1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 143. He later submitted for the record a supplemen112

tary statement that cited one million bales in four categories (chenille tufted fabrics, napped
fabrics, net fabrics and fine goods, and pyroxylin coated fabrics) as the "principal ones
affected." Id. at 145-46.
113

1947 Hearings,supra note 66, at 137.

Id. at 143.
115 Id. at 173.
1A

116 See, e.g., Testimony of Emmet J. Driscoll, Turner Halsey Co. and Cotton Textile Institute,
1947 Hearings, supra note 66, at 176; testimony of J. B. Mellor, Cone Export and Com-

Published
by Co.,
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
Inc., Id. at 178. 1977
mission

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 1

ARON LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 10:2

industry took quick steps to cease marketing of the cowboy suits that
had led to newspaper headlines, public outcry over burning children, and
letters to congressmen such as Representative Canfield. The issue thus lost
the attention of Congress.
But the reasons why no flammable fabrics legislation resulted in 1947
are not nearly as important for present public policy in federal product
safety regulation as the implications the 1947 Hearings hold for the present

day "standards consensus" reflected in CPSC Chairman Simpson's "100
mandatory standards by 1982" plan.

The 1947 Hearings illustrate three characteristics which suggest that
a standards approach to product safety regulation has little to do with
protection of the public against unreasonable risks.
A. The ProductsLiability Connection
Perhaps the most unusual characteristic of the 1947 Hearings was
the search for a federal flammability standard which would be given
judicial notice as the conclusive standard of care in products liability
litigation. Hearings in the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's on legislative

proposals for federal product safety regulation would generally not deal

with this issue, with its obvious anti-injured user overtones, as openly.11
In contrast, 1976 thus far has seen two noteworthy open confrontations of
117 The "products liability connection" though less visible, is generally just below the surface.
For example, one of the first petitions filed with the CPSC under Section 10 of the CPSA,
15 U.S.C. 2060(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), which generally permits "any person" to petition the
CPSC to develop a consumer product safety standard, requested development of a swimming
pool slide safety standard. The petition, filed by the National Swimming Pool Institute
(NSPI), a trade association representing swimming pool manufacturers, alleged that several
product liability claims relating to the use of swimming pool slides had been filed against
slide manufacturers in the past two years and that these claims demonstrated the need of
both producers and consumers for an industry wide standard for swimming pool slides.
See PROPOSAL OF A CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARD FOR SWIMMING POOL SLIDES,
Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner R. David Pittle, December 9, 1975.
The Commission eventually accepted an offer from NSPI to develop a recommended
standard under Section 7 of the CPSA, the so-called offeror provision of the act which
invites private groups to develop a proposed federal standard and submit it to the Commission for evaluation, revision and promulgation through the informal rulemaking procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 (1970). See text accompanying note
12 supra. On December 23, 1975, the CPSC, by a 3-2 vote, approved a final manda
tory standard for swimming pool slides which in the author's opinion is little more
than a ratification of the swimming pool slide industry's present technology, and
which in its federal encouragement of "safe belly-first slides" may actually increase
risks to children. For a legal analysis of the Commission's proposed swimming pool slide
standard, which differed little from the final standard, see a comment filed by the author
on December 9, 1975, with the Commission. The author is presently preparing a law review
article on the development of the swimming pool slide standard, which became effective
July 17, 1976. The Fifth Circuit on July 20, 1976, denied a motion by a slide manufacturer
to stay the standard pending judicial review, but granted the manufacturer's request for
expedited review of the rule. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, [1973] 4 PROD. SAFETY &
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
LLunLrrv REP. (BNA) 547.
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this issue in Chairman Simpson's January 1976 Congressional testimony,
and in Congressional consideration of the swine flu legislation in the summer
of 1976.
Had industry in the 1940's and 1950's ever been able to sell Congress,
and later the courts, on giving conclusive effect to federal safety standards
in products liability litigation, the products liability explosion of the 1960's
with its development of theories of strict tort liability might never have
occurred. That the limitation of an injured user's right to recover in tort
so dominated the first Congressional hearings which established standard
setting as the federal government's approach to product safety strongly
suggests that standards setting as a regulatory procedure has little if anything
to do with consumer protection.
B. Standardsas the Battlegroundfor Industry Cost Shifting
The 1947 Hearings illustrate very well another characteristic of the
standards process that has little to do with consumer protection against
unreasonable risks. Standards setting is little more than an arena in which
segments of the affected industry attempt to shift the safety costs connected
with the products from which they draw profits to another part of the
distribution chain. Thus the retailer written Arnold Bill imposed liabilities
for fabric fire losses and testing costs on everyone but retailers; Dr. Murchison
suggested that the retailers should bear the liabilities rather than the manufacturing end of the cotton textile industry which he represented. Rep.
Johnson's statement118 that in 1933 as head of an NRA Board he had seen
what a part of the industry could do to the rest of it under NRA methods
could well be recast as follows: in the 1947 Hearings, Congress got a good
view of what one part of the textile industry would try to do to another
under a standards setting approach to product safety regulation.
Such open industry warfare, of course, was probably one of the
major reasons no flammable fabrics legislation emerged from the House
Commerce Committee in 1947, since major federal safety legislation generally cannot be passed when any important regulated party totally opposes
it as the cotton textile industry opposed the 1947 flammable fabrics proposals.
In the future, industry would learn to use the voluntary standards
process to make its market compromises in private and reach a consensus
on a safety standard before approaching the federal government for legislative ratification of its consensus. Thus by 1953, when the Flammable
Fabrics Act was passed, as Heffron notes, the industry had developed a
commercial standard which it simply got Congress to incorporate in the
118 See text accompanying 72 supra.
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statute. To a reader of the 1947 Hearings, Heffron's statement that 99
percent of fabrics passed the 1953 legislative standard and that "study
after study showed that clothing involved in bums consistently passed the
test" is not surprising, since the 1947 Hearings show that standards establishment is primarily a mechanism for industry division of markets and
allocation of costs, and has little to do with protecting consumers from
flammable fabrics.
C. Standards Setting is Inherently Technologically Regressive
The 1947 Hearings illustrate very well a third limitation on standard
setting as the primary approach to product safety regulation. Something
inherent in the standards setting process prohibits incorporation into the
standard a requirement that will stretch existing technology.
In the shadows surrounding the 1947 Hearings was an important new
technology which had great promise for consumer protection - chemical
flameproofing and flame retardant processes which were on the verge of
being marketed. Rep. Hinshaw's exchange with Mr. Dorn119 in which Hinshaw
suggests broadening the legislation to protect consumers from multiple source
fire hazards by flameproofing fabrics used in the home as well as worn, and
Mr. Dor's answer that curtains, rugs and furniture coverings could be
flameproofed just as well as wearing apparel indicates that an important
new safety technology was imminent. The provisions in the Johnson Bill
that any flameproofing last the life of the fabric is further evidence of the
imminence of this new safety technology. A requirement in federal flammable
fabrics standards legislation to require flameproofing would not have been
so far in advance of current technology as to be unrealistic; indeed it would
probably have given such technology the national market it needed to become
economically feasible.
That no such result occurred illustrates an important characteristic of
the standard setting process. Far from being a process which consistently
sets realistic safety goals for industry to strive to meet, it does little more
than ratify the lowest common denominator in existing technology. To
the extent consumer protection against unreasonable product risks rests on
new technological development, a standards approach by its nature is
regressive.
Federal product safety policymakers might well ask whether there
are alternative regulatory approaches to product safety. The writer would
suggest three.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
119 See note 93 supra.
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1. The PublicHearing-IndustryEnergization Model
Former National Commission on Product Safety Chairman Arnold
Elkind's idea that a "body similar to the NCPS should remain in existence
to conduct investigations, hold hearings and make public statements about
specific products,"' 20 provides an alternative model for governmental action
aimed at eliminating unreasonable risks associated with consumer products.
Elkind's idea undoubtedly arises from the success the NCPS enjoyed between
1968 and 1970 in using the public hearing as a mechanism to spur industry
into action to eliminate product risks before the federal government moved
in with regulations. The Final Report of the NCPS describes the accomplishments of the NCPS, which was merely a Congressionally created study
commission with no regulatory powers whatsoever:
In the course of our mission, we scheduled a series of hearings, conducted studies of product hazards and their prevention, arranged for
testing of some products, contracted for studies, and prepared reports
for the public and for Congress on the means of reducing unreasonable
hazards in consumer products. The effect of these activities took form
in legislative action, improved safety programs in certain industries
and voluntary organizations, and in a positive response from the consuming public. 2 '
After citing the NCPS' influence on voluntary industry standards involving safety glass, floor furnaces, power mowers, glass bottles, and TV
sets, and federal, state, and local governmental responses to NCPS activities,
the report continued:
The interest of the press and the audio-visual media in reporting our
philosophy, accomplishments and goals made a strong public impression.
All hearings were well covered by reporters from national as well as
local media. Editors were surprisingly receptive to the naming of
products and model numbers listed as hazardous by us. The public
responded to news of the hearings with letters and telephone calls about
product hazards.
Undeniably, the considerable interest shown by the majority of the
news media had a subtle influence on many industries.'
One problem with public hearings as a major approach is that over a
period of time the public may become blase about the latest expose. Also,
certain minimal sanctions-perhaps injunctive power and provision for civil
penalties-would probably have to be provided and utilized to maintain
credibility with industry over the long run. The Elkind model also is
See note 22 supra.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 128.
2
1 2 Id.
128-29.
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dependent on continued interest and willingness to react by Congress and
state legislatures, who have traditionally given product safety a rather low
priority. With all these limitations, however, the writer believes that for the
Consumer Product Safety Commission to hold a few NCPS style public
hearings under Section 27(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act"'2 might
well do more to eliminate unreasonable consumer product risks and at
much less cost."'
2. The Defects Notification Model
A second possible non-standards approach to product safety is epitomized in Section 15 of the CPSA, which requires manufacturers who
"obtain information" that their product "contains a defect which could
create a substantial product hazard"12 5 to immediately inform the Commission of such defect. Section 15 then establishes a legal framework within
which the Commission can order the manufacturer to notify consumers and/or
repair, replace or refund the purchase price. The Commission has implemented Section 15 with an elaborate regulation which establishes a series
of extra-legal voluntary corrective action plans and consent agreements.'
Such a system, if it received a large share of the resources allocated to
standard setting, could be monitored vigorously by the Commission, be
supported by publicity in conducting recalls, and could thereby provide
important economic incentives to manufacturers to improve their quality
control and product safety design.
The Commission's administration of Section 15 has been curious. On
the one hand, Chairman Simpson has referred to implementation of Section
15 as the Commission's biggest success story. In Congressional testimony,
he has stated that under Section 15, "more than 350 reports have been
acted upon to date, involving more than 24 million items, and resulting
in the correction of almost four million of these items. An indication of
the impact and importance of the section can also be found in the fact
that almost 4,000 technical inquiries have been received by the Commission
123

Section 27(a), 15 U.S.C. §2076(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides as follows:

The commission may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or agency
as it may designate, conduct any hearing or other inquiry necessary or appropriate
to its functions anywhere in the United States.

12 4 The entire NCPS authorization was $2 million. Act of Nov. 20, 1967 supra note 20.
President Ford has requested a $37 million budget for 1977. THE BUDGET OF THE UrrrED
STATES GOVERNMENT,

fiscal year 1977, app. at 715 (1976).

125 Section 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §2064(b)(2)

(Supp. IV, 1974) defines "substantial product
hazard" as "a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective

products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to the public."

126 40 Fed. Reg. 30936 (1975).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss2/1
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requesting advice about Section 15
and manufacturing practices."' 27

-

many raising questions of design

On the other hand, in the same Congressional testimony, Chairman
Simpson revealed that, far from shifting Commission resources in Section
15 enforcement, he instead had "ordered a freeze on recruitment or hiring
by the field, with a corresponding transfer of positions to headquarters to
support the required standard development program and related activities"." 8
Thus does the Section 15 "biggest success story" take second place to the
"standards faith."
3. A ManufacturerInternal OrganizationModel
A third possible non-product safety standards approach would be for
the CPSC to require companies whose products are determined at a hearing
to present either an "unreasonable risk" under Section 7129 or a "substantial
product hazard" under Section 15130 to adopt a federally mandated management organization of the product safety design and quality control function.
The Commission has already issued a "Handbook"'' which contains
a systems standard which "provides guidelines to executive industrial management for establishing systems to prevent and detect safety hazards in consumer
products." While the Handbook states that "the provisions of this Standard
are intended for voluntary implementation by industry", the Commission
could indirectly enforce such a "systems standard" in the following way:
a. The CPSC could hold a public hearing under Section 27(a) of the
CPSA13 ' to determine which consumer products within a product category
present either an "unreasonable risk" under Section 7 or a "substantial
product hazard" under Section 15.
require, by special
I
b. The CPSC could then, under Section 27(b) (1)
in
writing a report
order, the manufacturers of such products to submit
and answers to questions concerning their product safety design and quality
control functions. For example, such manufacturers could be asked to
127 Statement of Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n,
Hearing on Regulatory Reform Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976).
128 Id. at 17.
129 15 U.S.C. §2056(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 4 supra.
130 Id. §2064. See note 126 supra.
131 CPSC, HANDBOOK & STANDARD FOR MANUFACTURING SAFER CONSUMER PRODUCTS (1975).
132 15 U.S.C. §2076(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), See note 124 supra.

Section 27(b) (1), 15 U.S.C. §2076(b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
The Commission shall also have the power(1) to require, by special or general orders, any person to submit inwriting such
reports and answers to questions as the Commission may prescribe; and such
submission shall be made within such reasonable period and under oath or
Commission may determine.
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explain how they were implementing the Handbook guidelines. Further,
a company's refusal to implement the guidelines could be indirectly enforced
by the CPSC taking regulatory and enforcement action against the product,
for example by beginning standard setting procedures under Section 7,
substantial product hazard procedures under Section 15, or even imminent
hazard proceedings under Section 12.11 If a manufacturer failed to file
a report, or arguably even if he filed a report failing to give information
on implementation of the Handbook guidelines, he would appear to have
committed an unlawful act under Section 19(a)(3),"' as a "failure or
refusal to make reports or provide information", and would therefore be
subject to an injunction under Section 22,136 which gives the U.S. District
Courts jurisdiction to restrain any violation of Section 19.
In any event, if the CPSC were faced with widespread manufacturer
refusal to implement the Handbook guidelines, it would have created the
basis for turning to Congress to provide a clear statement for its power
to mandate management organization of the product safety design or
control functions.
CONCLUSION

Whether the above three proposals are workable and would operate
in practice to better accomplish the primary purpose of the CPSA of
eliminating unreasonable risks can of course only be determined if the
CPSC were to conduct small scale pilot studies to test their effectiveness.
One way this could be done would be to select three broad product categories,
and try out each proposal on one category, i.e. have an NCPS style public
hearing on one product category, shift a large percentage of CPSC
resources in another product category from standards development to
substantial product hazard enforcement, and hold a Section 27(a) hearing
in another product category with particular attention directed to manufacturers' quality control procedures.
Evaluation of the effectiveness of such pilot studies would be a
refreshing change from the "standards faith" which has mesmerized product
safety regulation since World War II at least, and which, in the context
of inflationary rises in the cost of products liability insurance, could be
converted into a means of denying persons compensation for product
related injuries.
Section 12 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. §2061(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), authorizes the Commission to: file in a United States district court an action (1) against an imminently hazardous consumer product for seizure of such product under sub-section (b)(2) of this
Section, or (2) against any person who is a manufacturer, distributor or retailer of such
product, or (3) against both . . . . As used in this section, and hereinafter in this chapter
the term "imminently hazardous consumer product" means a consumer product which presents imminent and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness, or severe personal injury.
185 15 U.S.C. §2068(a) (3)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
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